Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioner, No. 18-600, Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. V. Renesas Electronics America, Inc. by Holbrook, Timothy R. et al.
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2018
Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property
Professors in Support of Petitioner, No. 18-600,
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. V.
Renesas Electronics America, Inc.
Timothy R. Holbrook
Emory University
Ann Bartow
Franklin Pierce Center for IP at UNH Law
Andrew Chin
University of North Carolina School of Law
David C. Hricik
Mercer University - Walter F. George School of Law
Yvette Joy Liebesman
Saint Louis University - School of Law
See next page for additional authorsFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons,
International Trade Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Holbrook, Timothy Richard and Bartow, Ann and Chin, Andrew and Hricik, David C. and Liebesman, Yvette Joy and Osborn, Lucas,
Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioner, No. 18-600, Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions,
Inc. V. Renesas Electronics America, Inc. (December 10, 2018). No. 18-600 In the Supreme Court of the United States, 2018.
Authors
Timothy R. Holbrook, Ann Bartow, Andrew Chin, David C. Hricik, Yvette Joy Liebesman, and Lucas Osborn
This article is available at Scholarship Commons: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty/302
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133293 
 
 
 
 
No. 16-1011 
 
IN THE 
 
 
 
 
WESTERNGECO LLC, 
Petitioner, 
 
 
ION GEOPHYSICAL CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
_____________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
BRIEF OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
NEITHER PARTY 
_____________ 
 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK 
Counsel of Record 
Emory University  
School of Law 
1301 Clifton Road 
Atlanta, Georgia 30322 
tholbrook@emory.edu 
(404) 712-0353 
 
SARAH M. SHALF 
Emory Law School 
Supreme Court  
Advocacy Program 
1301 Clifton Road 
Atlanta, Georgia 30322 
sshalf@emory.edu 
(404) 712-4652 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133293 
i 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ....................... 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 1 
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2 
 
I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY SHOULD APPLY TO 
REMEDIAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS. ............. 2 
A. The Supreme Court Has Emphasized the 
Importance of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, Particularly in the 
Context of Patent Law. .............................. 2 
B. The Supreme Court Has Never Expressly 
Held Whether the Presumption Applies 
Separately to Remedial Provisions After a 
Determination of Liability Has Been Made.
 .................................................................... 6 
C. The Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality Should Apply 
Separately to Remedial Statutory 
Provisions. .................................................. 8 
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION IN 
THIS CASE WOULD STILL PERMIT AN AWARD 
OF DAMAGES. ...................................................... 10 
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
ELABORATE ON WHAT COURTS SHOULD DO 
AFTER CONCLUDING EITHER STEP ONE OR 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133293 
ii 
 
 
 
STEP TWO OF RJR NABISCO HAS BEEN 
SATISFIED. ........................................................... 14 
A. Courts Should Expressly Consider 
Potential Conflicts with Foreign Law and 
Other Comity Concerns When Deciding 
Whether to Apply a Statute 
Extraterritorially. .................................... 15 
B. The Court Should Explain Whether the 
Presumption or Other Concerns of 
Extraterritoriality Should Inform 
Proximate Cause. ..................................... 19 
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22 
APPENDIX – LIST OF SIGNATORIES .................. 1a 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856) ..................... 3 
Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell  
Technology Group, Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283  
(Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................... 9, 21 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,  
406 U.S. 518 (1972) .................................................. 3 
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,  
499 U.S. 244 (1991) .................................................. 2 
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) ................ 3 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.,  
461 U.S. 648 (1983) ................................................ 11 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,  
569 U.S. 108 (2013) ............................................ 2, 16 
Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp.,  
137 S. Ct. 734 (2017) .................................. 12, 14, 15 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,  
550 U.S. 437 (2007) ........................................ 3, 5, 14 
Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.,  
561 U.S. 247 (2010) ............................................ 2, 16 
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.,  
418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................. 12 
Power Integrations v. v. Fairchild Semiconductor, 
711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................ 8, 9 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc.,  
56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .......................... 19, 20 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,  
136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) .................................... passim 
Star–Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co.,  
769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) ................................ 18 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc.,  
344 U.S. 280 (1952) ................................................ 17 
iv 
 
 
 
Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960  
(9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................ 17 
WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,  
136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) ............................................ 21 
WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,  
791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................. 21 
WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,  
837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .............................. 21 
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309  
(Fed. Cir. 2012)....................................................... 12 
Statutes 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ...................................................... 11 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) .............................................. 4, 13 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) .............................................. 5, 13 
35 U.S.C. § 284 ............................................................ 7 
Other Authorities 
Amy Landers, U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality Within 
the International Context, 36 REV. LITIG. BRIEF 28 
(2016) ................................................................ 10, 18 
Brief for Petitioner (filed Feb. 23, 2018) ..................... 8 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae  
(filed Dec. 6, 2017) .................................................... 8 
Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway 
Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134 (2016) ....... 7, 15 
Mark A. Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in 
IP Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2017) .................... 21 
Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73 (2017) ...................... 7, 18 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, 
and Patent Infringement Damages,  
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745 (2017) ............. passim 
v 
 
 
 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in  
U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119 
(2008) ............................................................ 5, 10, 18 
Rules 
Supreme Court Rule 37.6 ............................................ 1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 
Amici are law professors who specialize in 
intellectual property law and who have previously 
published on, or have interest in, the issue of 
extraterritoriality.  Amici have no personal stake in 
the outcome of this case but have an interest in seeing 
that the patent laws develop in a way that promotes 
rather than impedes innovation.  A complete list of 
amici is included in Appendix A. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
This case presents an issue of importance that 
transcends patent law: whether the presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws 
applies separately to the remedial provisions of a 
statute.  Here, the issue arises in the context of 
damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 of the Patent Act that 
arise from infringement under an expressly 
extraterritorial provision, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
 
The Supreme Court should first conclude that the 
presumption does apply to remedial provisions.  That 
                                                          
1    Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm 
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
that no counsel or a party made a monetary contribution 
intended to the preparation or submission of this brief and no 
person other than amici curiae, their members, or their counsels 
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.  
  Both Petitioner and Respondent filed blanket consent to the 
filing of amicus curiae briefs, both of which are on file with the 
clerk.   
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conclusion should not end the inquiry, however.  The 
Court should require a formal consideration of comity 
and potential conflicts with foreign law before 
allowing an award of damages arising outside of the 
United States.  Additionally, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should be considered as part of the 
proximate cause analysis when determining whether 
the asserted damages are appropriate.  
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY SHOULD APPLY TO 
REMEDIAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS.  
 
A. The Supreme Court Has Emphasized the 
Importance of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, Particularly in the 
Context of Patent Law.  
 
The Supreme Court has established that there is a 
strong presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101, 2106 (2016) 
(finding presumption rebutted for § 1962 of Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act but not 
§ 1964(c)); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 
U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (relying on presumption to 
decline to extend reach of Alien Tort Statute); 
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 
265 (2010) (relying on presumption to decline 
application of United States securities law to foreign 
conduct); E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 259 (1991) (using presumption to decline 
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application of Title VII to employment practices of 
U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens abroad). 
Although Congress undisputedly has the authority to 
regulate acts outside of the territorial boundaries of 
the United States, the Court has recognized that 
“legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .” Foley Bros. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).  
 
The Court has noted that the presumption is 
particularly appropriate in the context of patent law.  
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-
55 (2007) (“The presumption that United States law 
governs domestically but does not rule the world 
applies with particular force in patent law.”). As far 
back as 1856, this Court rejected the extraterritorial 
reach of a patent: “The power thus granted is domestic 
in its character, and necessarily confined within the 
limits of the United States.” Brown v. Duchesne, 60 
U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (holding U.S. patent rights do not 
extend to invention on foreign vessel in U.S. port).  
 
More recently, this Court again rejected a party’s 
attempt to use its patent to control extraterritorial 
activity. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 
the Supreme Court concluded that the manufacture of 
all components of a patented invention in the United 
States, that subsequently was assembled abroad, did 
not constitute infringement of a U.S. patent. 406 U.S. 
518, 529 (1972). The Court emphasized that “[o]ur 
patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial 
effect.” Id. at 531.  
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Congress legislatively overturned the 
extraterritorial aspect of Deepsouth by adopting 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) in 1984.  Section 271(f), the statutory 
provision at issue in this case, focuses on acts of 
exportation to foreign markets.  The provision defines 
two forms of infringement.  The first directly relates 
to the specific fact pattern in Deepsouth: 
 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes 
to be supplied in or from the United States all 
or a substantial portion of the components of 
a patented invention, where such components 
are uncombined in whole or in part, in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination 
of such components outside of the United 
States in a manner that would infringe the 
patent if such combination occurred within 
the United States, shall be liable as an 
infringer. 
 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).  Second, Congress went beyond 
the facts of Deepsouth to afford patent owners 
additional protections from the exportation of 
components with no non-infringing substitutes: 
 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes 
to be supplied in or from the United States 
any component of a patented invention that is 
especially made or especially adapted for use 
in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, where such 
component is uncombined in whole or in part, 
knowing that such component is so made or 
adapted and intending that such component 
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will be combined outside of the United States 
in a manner that would infringe the patent if 
such combination occurred within the United 
States, shall be liable as an infringer.   
 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).   
 
 This Court has relied on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to construe that provision 
narrowly. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Court 
held that (1) only computer software, not software in 
the abstract, could constitute a “component” under 
§ 271(f), 550 U.S. 437, 449-50 (2007), and (2) such 
components were not “supplied” under § 271(f) when 
copies of the software were made outside of the United 
States. Id. at 452-54. To support this interpretation, 
the Court specifically noted that “[a]ny doubt that 
Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass 
would be resolved by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality . . . .” Id. at 454. Notwithstanding 
that Congress explicitly abrogated Deepsouth as it 
relates to exports to afford some extraterritorial 
protection to U.S. patent holders, the Court rejected 
AT&T’s argument that the presumption was 
inapplicable and used the presumption to construe 
§  271(f) narrowly. Id. at 454-56. See generally 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. 
Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2135-36 
(2008) [hereinafter Extraterritoriality] (discussing 
importance of the use of the presumption in 
Microsoft).  
 
The Supreme Court’s explication of the 
presumption culminated in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), where 
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the Court articulated a two-step framework for 
addressing whether a statute has extraterritorial 
reach.  First, a court must determine whether the 
statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it 
applies extraterritorially, thereby rebutting the 
presumption against it. Id. at 2101. Satisfying step 
one is sufficient to end the inquiry, and a court need 
only proceed to step two if step one is not met.  Id.  
 
If the statute does not clearly have extraterritorial 
reach, step two requires a court to look at the location 
of the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus.  Id.  The 
statute’s application is domestic (and therefore within 
the court’s jurisdiction) when the conduct relevant to 
the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, even 
if other conduct occurred abroad. Id.  The statute’s 
application is extraterritorial and thus impermissible 
when conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a 
foreign country regardless of any other conduct that 
occurred in the United States. Id.   
 
B. The Supreme Court Has Never Expressly 
Held Whether the Presumption Applies 
Separately to Remedial Provisions After a 
Determination of Liability Has Been Made.  
 
In all of the cases in which the Court has addressed 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, it has 
confronted an issue of liability: whether activities 
outside of the United States could nevertheless create 
liability within the United States.   
 
This case is different.  The issue is the availability 
of damages for activities arising outside the territorial 
United States.  This Court has never squarely 
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addressed whether the presumption applies to 
remedial provisions.  This Court has intimated that 
the presumption applies at all levels of a statutory 
scheme.  See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 
(rejecting Second Circuit’s holding that “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply 
to § 1964(c) independently of its application to 
§ 1962”); see also Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and 
the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134, 139 
(2016) (“[T]he Court announced a new requirement 
that the presumption be applied separately to every 
statutory provision, whether substantive, remedial, or 
jurisdictional.”).  Indeed, in RJR Nabisco, a four 
justice majority of the Court applied the presumption 
separately to different provisions of the statute, 
suggesting that the presumption would separately 
apply to remedial provisions of a statute.   See Sapna 
Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 103 (2017).   
   
To address the question presented in this case, the 
Court must necessarily answer this question.  Here, 
liability has been established under § 271(f).  The only 
issue is the appropriate scope of damages permitted 
under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the damages provision of the 
Patent Act.   That provision notes that “the court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention 
by the infringer.”  35 U.S.C. § 284.  Although § 284 
does not note any territorial limitations itself, it does 
reference acts of infringement, which are defined by 
35 U.S.C. § 271.  Answering whether the presumption 
applies to § 284, therefore, is a necessary prerequisite 
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to determining whether damages should be available 
in this case.  
 
C. The Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality Should Apply Separately 
to Remedial Statutory Provisions.  
 
The presumption against extraterritoriality 
should apply both in the liability and the remedies 
contexts.  The line between liability and damages is 
gossamer thin. The question of whether one is liable 
for extraterritorial conduct leads to the same place—
that is, the determination of the extraterritorial reach 
of a U.S. patent right. From an extraterritorial 
perspective, a determination of liability or an award 
of damages both attempt to regulate conduct outside 
of the United States.  Only applying a “one pass” rule 
for the presumption, as argued by both the Petitioner, 
see Brief for Petitioner at 46 (filed Feb. 23, 2018), and 
the United States, see Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 14 (filed Dec. 6, 2017), would 
impermissibly permit certain damages arising from 
foreign activity and inappropriately extend the reach 
of United States patent law outside the territorial 
limits established in the Microsoft case.   
   
The precursors to the present case show the 
danger in failing to apply the presumption separately 
to damages.  For example, in Power Integrations v. v. 
Fairchild Semiconductor, 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), the Federal Circuit confronted a scenario 
where there was an act of domestic infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which is limited to acts 
“within the United States.”   Id. at 1348. The patentee, 
however, sought damages for the lost profits for its 
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foregone sales outside of the United States that arose 
as a result of the domestic act of infringement.  Id.   
The Federal Circuit rejected the damages theory 
based on a strict territorial rule regarding patent 
damages.  If the presumption did not apply to 
remedies, however, then there would have been an 
odd result: the statute would have failed both steps 
one and two of the RJR Nabisco test because the 
statute is clearly territorial and the focus of the 
statute is infringing acts within the United States.  
Indeed, it is conceivable that a court would never have 
thought to consider the presumption at the liability 
phase.  Yet, any and all damages that possibly could 
flow from those domestic acts would be permissible, 
regardless of where the acts triggering those damages 
arose.  Effectively, the patentee would be using its 
United States patent to regulate those foreign sales.   
 
Subsequent to Power Integrations, the Federal 
Circuit encountered a similar scenario, with the 
patentee seeking a reasonable royalty as damages 
under 35 U.S.C. § 284. In Carnegie Mellon University 
v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), there was a domestic use of the 
patented invention; the patentee, however, sought a 
reasonable royalty for the defendant’s sales made 
overseas.  Id. at 1305.  The Federal Circuit, relying on 
Power Integrations, rejected such damages.  Id. at 
1310-11.  A failure to apply the presumption 
separately to both liability and damages would result 
in allowing the patentee, through the use of 
reasonable royalties, to attempt to regulate foreign 
activities.  
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These cases demonstrate that a liability versus 
remedies line is a distinction without a difference.  
The acts that generated the damages sought by the 
patentee could also have triggered liability in the 
relevant countries where their foreign acts occurred. 
Whether these are viewed as now-past acts that 
trigger liability (upon which damages could be based) 
or seen as a pure damages issue is irrelevant to the 
policies that underlie the presumption, including 
concerns of comity and interference with the 
sovereignty of another country.  Holbrook, 
Extraterritoriality, supra, at 2126-27 (2008); Amy 
Landers, U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality Within the 
International Context, 36 REV. LITIG. BRIEF 28, 28-29 
(2016). 
 
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION IN 
THIS CASE WOULD STILL PERMIT AN AWARD 
OF DAMAGES. 
 
Application of the RJR Nabisco framework in this 
case would permit an award of damages in this case 
under § 271(f).  This contrasts significantly with how 
the presumption would apply to infringement under 
§ 271(a), as was the case in Power Integrations and 
Carnegie Mellon. 
 
Section 284 is textually silent as to its territorial 
limits.  Instead, it references “damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement,” thus incorporating 
the acts in the separate subsections of § 271.  While    
§ 284 is meant to be compensatory in nature, see Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 
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(1983),2 such focus does not mandate that territorial 
limits be ignored. That finding would fly in the face of 
the presumption against territoriality. Instead, a 
court should look at the relevant infringement 
provision to assess the territorial limits of damages for 
that provision.  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, 
Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement 
Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1777-78 
(2017).     
 
The various infringement provisions of § 271 differ 
significantly in their scope and purpose.  As such, it 
would be inappropriate to treat all of them collectively 
under the presumption, as the Federal Circuit has 
apparently done, for purposes of assessing the 
appropriate territorial limit on patent damages.   Id. 
at 1778.  Application of step one of RJR Nabisco, 
therefore, leads to different outcomes as to the 
availability of damages under § 284 for infringement 
under § 271(a) and § 271(f).   
 
Section 271(a) has strict territorial limits, limiting 
liability to acts “within the United States” or 
importation “into the United States.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a).  With its strict territorial language, step one 
of RJR Nabisco would not be satisfied.  There is no 
intent on the part of Congress to embrace foreign 
activity under § 271(a).  In all likelihood, damages 
arising from infringement under § 271(a) would likely 
fail step two as well.  Analysis of step two in isolation, 
                                                          
2 The Court was not addressing the full scope of damages 
permissible in General Motors; instead, the narrow issue before 
it was “the standard applicable to the award of prejudgment 
interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284.”Gen. Motors, 461 U.S at 651. 
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without the particular facts of the case, is difficult.  In 
the main, however, we would expect damages for 
foreign-based conduct on the part of a defendant to fail 
step two given the territorial limits because the 
infringing acts would need to be within the United 
States.3 
 
In contrast, Congress enacted § 271(f) with the 
express purpose of creating extraterritorial reach to 
United States patent holders.  Congress wanted to “to 
fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights,” Life 
Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 743, 
(2017), created by Deepsouth’s embrace of strict 
territorial limits to United States patent protection.  
By adopting § 271(f), Congress expressly 
contemplated the regulation of foreign markets, 
satisfying step one of RJR Nabisco.   
 
                                                          
3 Step two might be satisfied in the situation of trans-border acts 
of infringement, where the primary act of infringement, such as 
use of the patented invention, arose in the United States.  In that 
case, the focus of § 271(a) – the use of the invention – arose in the 
United States, although certain other acts arose outside of the 
United States.  Such a scenario can be seen in NTP v. Research 
in Motion, where the Federal Circuit concluded there was patent 
infringement for the use of the Blackberry® system.  In NTP, Inc. 
v. Research In Motion, Ltd., part of the infringing system was 
located in Canada.  418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
abrogated on other grounds by Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 
F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit nevertheless 
concluded that customers used the system within the United 
States because “RIM's customers located within the United 
States controlled the transmission of the originated information 
and also benefited from such an exchange of information.” Id.  
Given the focus of the statute – infringing uses within the United 
States – a court could conclude that such a scenario satisfies step 
two of RJR Nabisco. See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at 1780. 
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Section 271(f) does require some domestic acts for 
there to be infringement.  Specifically, an infringer 
must “suppl[y] or cause[] to be supplied in or from the 
United States” either “all or a substantial portion of 
the components of a patented invention” or “any 
component of a patented invention that is especially 
made or especially adapted for use in the invention 
and not a staple article or commodity.”  35 U.S.C. 
§§ 271(f)(1) & (2).  The markets at stake, however, are 
not domestic markets.  Instead, they are the foreign 
markets to where the components are being exported.  
Step one of RJR Nabisco, therefore, is satisfied 
because Congress spoke to extraterritoriality in the 
statute.  See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra at 1783.  
 
Technically, consideration of step two of the RJR 
Nabisco analysis is not required because step one is 
satisfied.  Nevertheless, the RJR Nabisco test would 
also be satisfied at step two as the focus of the statute 
is exportation of components intended to be combined 
overseas to create the patented invention, thus 
contemplating relief for conduct in foreign markets.  
Step two’s consideration of § 271(f)’s “focus,” in 
conjunction with § 284’s remedial purpose, further 
supports affording damages for extraterritorial acts.  
Congress designed the statute to protect patent 
owners against the territorial arbitrage present in 
Deepsouth.  
 
Consequently, applying the RJR Nabisco 
framework here would permit an award of damages 
for lost profits in this case because Congress has 
demonstrated its intent to permit extraterritorial 
reach under § 271(f) and consequently for damages 
under § 284 for damages under that provision.     
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ELABORATE 
ON WHAT COURTS SHOULD DO AFTER 
CONCLUDING EITHER STEP ONE OR STEP TWO 
OF RJR NABISCO HAS BEEN SATISFIED. 
 
As presently articulated, the RJR Nabisco test 
appears to operate like a light switch – the statute 
either has extraterritorial reach or it does not.  This 
approach is inconsistent with previous articulations of 
the presumption, however.  For instance, the Court 
relied on the presumption in Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT & T Corp., to afford a narrow interpretation to 
§ 271(f).  550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).  The Court used the 
presumption to narrowly interpret § 271(f), limiting 
the definition of “component” to exclude software in 
the abstract and to conclude the defendant had not 
supplied a component of the invention.  Id. at 451-52, 
454.   
 
The Court’s use of the presumption in Microsoft 
suggested a subtler, more pervasive role for the 
presumption as a means for narrowly interpreting 
statutes that have extraterritorial reach.  Yet, under 
RJR Nabisco, the Court’s analysis would stop at step 
one. Today, it is not clear whether the presumption 
still operates at the level of statutory interpretation 
even once the presumption has been rebutted, as the 
Court reasoned in Microsoft.4  The Court should use 
                                                          
4 This tension was present in Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega 
Corp., in which the Court interpreted the § 271(f)(1)  language 
referencing “all or a substantial portion” of the components.  137 
S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017).  Although the Court ultimately did not 
rely on the presumption at all in reaching its decision – indeed 
the Court never used the term “presumption” – the tension 
between Microsoft and RJR Nabisco was debated during oral 
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this case as a vehicle to further elaborate on whether 
the presumption still has teeth even after application 
of the RJR Nabisco framework.  See Gardner, supra 
at 135 (noting that the Court in RJR Nabisco “missed 
an opportunity to provide much-needed guidance to 
judges on how to interpret statutes that rebut the 
presumption”).   
 
Two additional considerations should be added to 
the RJR Nabisco framework regarding how to 
interpret statutes that have rebutted the presumption 
or otherwise will permit extraterritorial reach.  First, 
courts should expressly consider issues of comity and 
potential conflicts with foreign law.  Second, courts 
should take into account territoriality in the damages 
context in analyzing proximate cause.  
 
A. Courts Should Expressly Consider Potential 
Conflicts with Foreign Law and Other Comity 
Concerns When Deciding Whether to Apply a 
Statute Extraterritorially. 
 
Given the increasingly global market, issues of 
extraterritoriality have come to the fore in patent law.  
It is increasingly common for goods to cross various 
borders, implicating the patent laws of a variety of 
countries.   In this regard, RJR Nabisco should not be 
read in a manner that is too capacious. Merely 
satisfying either step could still result in considerable 
extraterritorial reach, risking various conflicts with 
                                                          
argument.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Life 
Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (No. 14-
1538) (Chief Justice noting “once you get over it [the 
presumption], you know, it’s over, and then you apply normal 
principles.”); see also Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at 1758-59. 
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foreign jurisdictions’ laws, a key consideration 
underpinning the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  
 
The Supreme Court should embrace consideration 
of comity and potential conflicts of law to balance 
against this risk.  Such an approach is not unwieldy 
nor even unprecedented.  Although the Court has 
suggested that the “presumption applies regardless of 
whether there is a risk of conflict between the 
American statute and a foreign law,” Morrison v. Nat'l 
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010), in 
practice the Court has considered possible conflicts.   
 
A review of the Supreme Court’s recent cases 
applying the presumption demonstrate that the Court 
considers this dynamic, even if the Court does not 
treat comity as a formal requirement.  For example, 
in RJR Nabisco itself, the Court noted that “providing 
a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a 
potential for international friction beyond that 
presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to 
that foreign conduct.”  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016); see also Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) 
(recognizing that “the danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is 
magnified in the context of the ATS, because the 
question is not what Congress has done but instead 
what courts may do”).  In so stating, the Court was 
stepping back from the language in Morrison.  The 
Court noted in RJR Nabisco that, while a conflict “is 
not a prerequisite for application of the 
presumption…, where such a risk is evident, the need 
to enforce the presumption is at its apex.”  136 S. Ct. 
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at 2107.  The court emphasized that the mere 
potential for a conflict was sufficient.  Id. (“It is to say 
only that there is a potential for international 
controversy that militates against recognizing 
foreign-injury claims without clear direction from 
Congress.”).  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
heightened attention to the presumption is 
appropriate where a potential conflict with foreign 
law exists.  As such, it is appropriate for courts to take 
comity expressly into account. 
 
The Court specifically embraced the consideration 
of potential conflicts in the context of the Lanham Act, 
the federal trademark law.  In Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co., Inc., the accused infringer was a U.S. citizen 
selling counterfeit watches bearing the trademark in 
Mexico.    344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952).   The Court 
expressly looked to a potential conflict of law – the 
ownership of the trademark – in holding that it was 
appropriate to apply the Lanham Act 
extraterritorially.  Id. at 289. 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently considered the extraterritorial reach of the 
Lanham Act post-RJR Nabisco and embraced the use 
of comity considerations. Specifically, in Trader Joe’s 
Co. v. Hallatt, the Ninth Circuit applied seven comity 
factors in assessing whether to apply the Lanham Act 
extraterritorially:  
 
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or 
policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the 
parties and the locations or principal places of 
business of corporations, (3) the extent to which 
enforcement by either state can be expected to 
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achieve compliance, (4) the relative significance 
of effects on the United States as compared 
with those elsewhere, (5) the extent to which 
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect 
American commerce, (6) the foreseeability of 
such effect, and (7) the relative importance to 
the violations charged of conduct within the 
United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.   
 
835 F.3d 960, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Star–
Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 
1395 (9th Cir. 1985)).  The Ninth Circuit’s approach is 
consistent with Bulova and demonstrates that there 
is space beyond RJR Nabisco for the consideration of 
potential conflicts of law in assessing whether 
domestic laws should apply extraterritorially. 
 
A similar approach should be used to inform the 
extraterritoriality of patent law.  To determine 
whether U.S. patent law should apply to 
extraterritorial conduct, courts should expressly 
consider foreign patent law and various conflicts that 
could arise.  See Holbrook, Boundaries, supra, at 
1788-90; Kumar, supra, at 111-12; Landers, supra, at 
45. Consideration of comity provides appropriate 
consideration for the sovereignty of foreign countries, 
who may have different policies regarding their 
patent regimes.  Landers, supra, at 39-42 (reviewing 
variances in different countries’ patent laws).  
Additionally, considering foreign law expressly could 
have laudable effects of exchanging ideas and views 
on patents. See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra, 
at 2186-88.  Courts should review potential conflicts 
of law if a patent exists in the foreign jurisdiction, 
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including ownership, validity, infringement, and 
damages. A consideration of comity concerns would 
afford a better balance in the application of U.S. law’s 
extraterritoriality than the current approach, which 
only tacitly acknowledges that concern. 
 
In this case, the lost sales of services arose on the 
high seas, suggesting that there is no potential 
conflict of law.  It may be the case, therefore, that 
damages are appropriate in this context.  The issue 
should be squarely addressed on remand to the 
Federal Circuit or the district court.   
 
B. The Court Should Explain Whether the 
Presumption or Other Concerns of 
Extraterritoriality Should Inform Proximate 
Cause. 
 
The presumption against extraterritoriality 
should have reach beyond operating as a lever for 
construing statutes with extraterritorial reach.  The 
presumption could also be used in evaluating 
proximate cause for damages, in this case under 35 
U.S.C. § 284.   
 
Section 284 is expressly compensatory in nature, 
requiring a court to “award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”  The 
Federal Circuit has embraced a broad conception of 
compensatory damages.  In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit held that a patentee 
could recover lost profits for foregone sales of the 
patentee’s product that was not covered by the patent 
at issue.  56 F.3d 1538, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  
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In so doing, the Federal Circuit eschewed a focus 
on the patent claims themselves in favor of an 
economic, market-driven approach to compensatory 
damages.  The court recognized that, to receive 
damages, a patent owner must prove both that, but 
for the infringement, the patentee would have made 
the foregone sale, as well as that the infringement was 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 
1546.  The court noted that proximate cause works to 
preclude damages that are too remote, and “the 
question of legal compensability is one ‘to be 
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed 
considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy 
and precedent.’” Id. (quoting 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS 
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906) (quoted in W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984)).  As a result, the 
Federal Circuit now focuses on whether the damages 
at issue are reasonably foreseeable to a competitor.  
Id. It is this purely economic-based approach that the 
petitioner and the United States believe should be the 
sole limit on damages. 
 
But proximate cause is not so simple.  As the 
Federal Circuit noted, it is not a singular analysis of 
foreseeability; instead, it is complex inquiry that 
includes policy and justice, similar to the concerns 
that underlie the presumption itself.  Proximate cause 
should take into account both the remoteness of the 
harm from the act generating liability and the 
extraterritorial reach of potential application of 
damages.  
 
There seems to be some expansion in the concept 
of foreseeability in the Federal Circuit’s cases.  For 
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example, in Carnegie Mellon, the patented invention 
was a method.  Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell 
Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 
2015).  Instead of damages being awarded for the use 
of the method, the court permitted the award of a 
royalty based on the sales of chips that would execute 
the method.  Id.  As such, the damages are a step 
removed from the classic measure of damages for 
infringing a patented method, which would be the 
value of the use of the method. See Holbrook, 
Boundaries, supra at 1791 (criticizing Carnegie 
Mellon on proximate cause grounds); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 
103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 254–57 (2017) (discussing 
issues of causation in patent damages).  
 
Similarly, in the instant case, the damages in 
dispute are not for lost profits from the sale of the 
patented invention. Instead, they are for “lost profits 
resulting from its failure to win foreign service 
contracts.”  WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical 
Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016), 
opinion reinstated WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION 
Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, No. 16-1011, 2018 WL 386561 
(U.S. Jan. 12, 2018).  The analysis here might be 
different if the lost profits sought were foregone sales 
of the patented invention.  But here, the damages 
sought are for a more remote harm. Courts should 
consider this remoteness in their proximate cause 
analysis.  
Relevant, then, to the proximate cause analysis 
should be the territorial location of the harm.  Just as 
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the presumption can be used to inform a court’s 
analysis of a statute, even one with extraterritorial 
reach, the Court should make clear that territoriality 
is also relevant in a proximate cause analysis.  
Territorial limits may not provide a bright-line 
proscription on all damages arising from activities 
outside of the United States, but such limits should 
inform how proximate a particular harm is to the 
domestic act of infringement.  This dynamic is 
particularly important when the damages sought are 
already one step removed from an award of lost profits 
simply for lost sales of the patented invention.   
CONCLUSION 
  
     This Court has yet to squarely address whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies 
separately to remedial provisions in a statute.  The 
answer to this question is important and transcends 
patent law.  The Court should hold that the 
presumption does apply separately to remedies, and 
that the presumption is rebutted here.   
That should not be the end of the inquiry, however.   
A court should explicitly consider issues of comity and 
conflicts with the law of the implicated foreign 
jurisdiction.  The Court should reconcile its patent 
jurisprudence with that of the Lanham Act and 
embrace the formal consideration of conflicts with 
foreign law.  Such consideration strikes a more 
appropriate balance between protecting U.S. patent 
owners and respecting the sovereignty of foreign 
countries.  Here, the infringement took place on the 
high seas, seemingly a “patent-free” zone, but this 
Court should require confirmation of that fact by the 
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district court or court of appeals.  Additionally, the 
Court should ensure that concerns of 
extraterritoriality are considered in analyzing the 
foreseeability of the infringement damages sought in 
this case. 
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